Westerners who had stayed in Nanjing during that time. 8 Although newspapers in unoccupied China did print eyewitness accounts, they are just part of larger war stories to arouse patriotism among the public. 9 Nobody could anticipate the scale of the terror in Nanjing during the wartime.
The earliest records of the Massacre were from foreign correspondents, who broke the news in the International Safety Zone in Nanjing. However, the Safety Zone witnessed only an extremely
small fraction of what actually happened in Nanjing with hundreds of thousands of residents.
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Initially, Western witnesses estimated a body count of 10,000 in and around Nanjing, which was quickly revised to 40,000 after an inspection of the city. 11 Nevertheless, all these earlier estimates were far less than the later burial figure of 200,000 validated by the Tokyo Tribunal in
1946.
On August 6 and 9 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively, resulting in the death of over 129,000 people. The use of nuclear weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki accelerated the end of the World War II. On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government announced its official surrender. After the war, the Tokyo International Military Tribunal began to try Japanese leaders in May 1946. The Tribunal described the Nanjing Massacre as follows:
The Japanese soldiers swarmed over the city and committed various atrocities. According to one of the eyewitnesses they were let loose like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city. It was said by eyewitnesses that the city appeared to have fallen into the hands of the Japanese as captured prey, that it had not merely been taken in organized warfare, and that the members of the victorious Japanese Army had set upon the prize to commit unlimited violence. Individual soldiers and small groups of two or three roamed over the city murdering, raping, looting, and burning. There was no discipline whatever. Many soldiers were drunk. Soldiers went through the streets indiscriminately killing Chinese men, women, and children without apparent provocation or excuse until in places the streets and alleys were littered with the bodies of their victims. According to another witness, Chinese were hunted like rabbits, everyone seen to move was shot. At least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese men, women, and children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings during the first two or three days of the Japanese occupation of the city.
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The Tribunal estimated that over 20,000 Chinese men of military age were killed, and around 200,000 Chinese civilians and prisoners of the war were killed, and around 20,000 cases of rape occurred in Nanjing during the first six weeks of Japanese occupation. 13 The judgment of the Tribunal has become the standard in Japanese school textbooks.
14 During that time, most Japanese attributed postwar miseries to their own wartime leaders.
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Anti-war and anti-nuclear weapon sentiments spread over the postwar Japanese society. them, only four Japanese put to death were associated with the Nanjing Massacre.
30
The Tokyo Trial concluded that over 200,000 Chinese had died in the Nanjing Massacre, and the Nanjing Trial pushed the figure to over 300,000. 31 Hence, the Chinese national and international law courts had "verified the Nanjing Massacre and set precedents for death totals in the hundreds of thousands of deaths in Nanjing, the execution of only seven men as retribution was definitely not justice in the eyes of Chinese people.
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With the retreat of the Nationalist Chinese government to Taiwan, the Communist Party took control of the mainland in the early 1950s. The Cold War had a new shape. Threatening by the growth of Communism in Asia, the American occupying force in Japan imitated a red purge. 34 More than 10,000 members and sympathizers of the Japanese Communist Party were removed from both the public and private sectors. 35 Meanwhile, those who have been purged before for supporting wartime militarism were allowed to return to public posts.
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In an era of perceived Communist threats, the United States continued renewing its support to a conservative Japan. In 1953, Japanese envoy Ikeda Hayato promised to the U.S. government that "the Japanese government will be responsible for facilitating a spontaneous spirit of patriotism and self-defense among the Japanese. 43 Because the Communist Party of China took leadership after the Japanese invasion of the mainland, the Nanjing Massacre was a crucial incident to criticize the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan, which failed to fulfill its duty of protecting Nanjing.
By the 1960s, the popular voices had also begun to center on the Massacre in China.
Chinese historians completed extensive research about the Massacre at Nanjing University. Japan, while the Japanese government was attracted to the huge market in China. In the following years, Japanese trade with China increased from $1.1 billion in 1972 to 3.3 billion in
1974
. 47 During that time, the only theme to define Sino-Japanese relations is "friendship" rather than war in Chinese newspapers. 48 Japan became an integral part of Chinese development plans and the Chinese government avoid criticism of Japan's wartime behaviors as much as possible.
Although Japanese militarism was still under the rug, Chinese leaders regarded it as "inconsequential" to present-day relations. 49 In 1974, the Chinese government set an entire month from September to October as "Japan-China Friendship Month."
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In the 1980s, the Japanese Ministry of Education shifted further towards conservativism as the government attempted to tone down the words related to Asian-Pacific War (1931 -1945 At the same time, the Japanese revisionist articles appeared with a much greater frequency in the 1980s. Tanaka Massaki, the secretary of General Matsui Mwane, the commander-in-chief during the Nanjing atrocities, was one of loudest voices. In his book the Fabrication of the "Nanjing Massacre" (1984) , Tanaka argued that no indiscriminate killing took place at all in Nanjing, and the Nanjing Massacre was a pure fabrication and propaganda created by the Tokyo Trial and the Chinese government. 58 The claim that the Nanjing Massacre was a latter-day fabrication received increasing support among the Japanese revisionists in the following decades.
Many scholars such as Watanabe Shoichi also joined in this fight.
In China, the textbook issue soon escalated into a discussion not only about the war, but also about specific symbols of Japanese aggression including the Nanjing Massacre. 59 The denials from the Japan led to unity among Chinese people. The Massacre was transformed from a war atrocity to "an international symbol of suffering", which brought together all who "identified with China and/or oppose Japan." For example, in the United States, Chinese Americans formed the Chinese Alliance for Memorial Justice in 1987 in New York.
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The Chinese government also used the textbook controversy to its own political agendas, such as the hope for reunification between Taiwan (Nationalist Chinese government) and the mainland China. 61 Hence, the Nanjing Massacre also became a crucial political incident to either criticize the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan domestically or to show solidarity in condemning Japan internationally.
The 1982 textbook controversy did not hurt the China-Japan relations in terms of trade, but the controversy has escalated in the following decades. The Japanese revisionists began to 58 Ibid., 87. 59 Mark Eykholt, "Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre," 32. 60 Takashi Yoshida, "The Nanjing Massacre in Japan," 92 61 Mark Eykholt, "Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre," 32.
openly claim that Japan's war was to liberate Asia from Western colonialism, while Chinese began to celebrate war anniversaries and covered the war atrocities in public media. 62 Many Japanese scholars followed "the fallacy of negative proof" to invalid the existence of Massacre.
63
Professor Watamabe Shochi argued that since there was no reference of the Nanjing Massacre either during the war or in Showa emperor's famous 1946 soliloquy, the Massacre was definitely fabricated at the postwar trials. Higashinakano Osamichi, a professor of intellectual history, reasoned, "since some fourteen Americans in Nanjing did not mention incidents of Japanese soldiers shooting Chinese civilians in one report to the American embassy, such alleged acts must not have happened." Based on their logics, because the Massacre was not mentioned in many contemporary English or Chinese publications in 1938, it must be a fabrication, although it might seem obvious to many why there was no record -Japanese wartime censorship.
Since then, Japan became a complex symbol where war, patriotism, and development intersected in China. On the one hand, the Chinese government used anti-Japanese war sentiment to "bolster public momentum for economic reform;" on the other hand, the Chinese government emphasized the friendly relations with Japan as a means to attain advanced technology and capital to further its economic reforms. 64 Some could also interpret that the friendly relationship on the surface was just a practical means that the Chinese government chose for its economy, while anti-Japanese sentiment was its true soul.
Yet, in Japan, two factions, progressives and revisionists, had never stopped fighting each other regarding the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese wartime crimes in general. As a result, the Chinese government has successfully built an official narrative on the Nanjing Massacre with a simple political message: "the revival of militarism in Japan must be stopped, and the Japanese government has to atone for the country's past aggression against
China." 71 Even nowadays, the Japanese revisionists are still notorious in the eyes of Chinese.
The authorities emphasized that Chinese people need to work together and build a stronger nation to avoid another tragedy of the Massacre in the future. Some common slogans during that time were "Backwardness invites aggression" and "If the country is not wealthy and strong, its people suffer."
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Meanwhile, the debate between the Japanese revisionists and progressives has remained insuperable, which ultimately led to the incorporation of the Nanjing Massacre into Japanese history. They represent two fundamentally different understandings of national pride. The Nanjing Massacre reflected a much larger debate on the concept of an ideal nation: whether Japan should acknowledge its past and apologize for the wartime crimes or stand against foreign pressure and insist that they fought a just war which liberated Asia from Western aggression.
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The revisionists either continued denying the existence of the Nanjing Massacre or degraded it as a common war atrocity with no significance. In conclusion, since 1937, the Nanjing Massacre has become a political symbol in the historiographies of China, Japan, and the United States. Its meaning constantly evolved through time in response to the larger political context. The Nanjing Massacre has never been evaluated objectively as a historical incident, but always manipulated by nations to serve their larger political agendas in different parts of the world. To this day, Chinese write the Massacre as victims and their descendants, while Japanese tend either to deny the Massacre to preserve a positive legacy for contemporary Japanese, or they "write out of a deeply felt sense" that Japanese wartime atrocities. 81 In the short term, the Chinese government will still use the Nanjing Massacre as a political tool to unify its people, while the Japanese revisionists will still assert that it is a latter-day fabrication.
Much of the time, people tend to forget about the long-time co-existence of progressive and revisionist viewpoints in Japan. We have allowed ourselves to adopt a reductionist view of the Massacre from either a "the Japanese" or "the Chinese" (victim-perpetrator) lenses. In the history textbooks and academia, the progressives view might actually have a dominant position in Japan. 82 However, precisely because revisionist views arouse more challenges to established history and provoke stronger emotional reactions in public, they will continuously receive more coverage from the mass media, both domestically and internationally. 83 accurate answer. Furthermore, does the actual figure really matter as much as historians argue?
Should the Nanjing Massacre as a human atrocity be as simple as a number game?
Nowadays, the studying of the Massacre has become a project of promoting hatred towards each other rather than preserving life. The Chinese government and Japanese government stand on the two ends of a spectrum and motivates their people to follow their attitudes. As historian Takashi Yoshida comments, "Too many people have responded to the Massacre not from a basis of reason, but according to national or ethnic identities that they have been reflexively conditioned to love or hate. In its worst moments, the debate over Nanjing has served to fuel the same kinds of racial and cultural hatred that tend to lead to massacres in the first place."
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It is important for Japanese to recognize the Massacre did happen rather than deny and erase it completely from history. Polarized accounts and nationalism-motivated narratives are not productive for a meaningful dialogue and peace. Is it possible to have a shared historical understanding that transcends nationalities? 86 Can human move beyond the politics and have a real discussion on the Massacre? The Nanjing Massacre should not just be a tragedy of Chinese, but a tragedy of the whole human race. Only when people share the history and memories of human atrocities internationally, can we potentially avoid similar mistakes in the future.
85 Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the "Rape of Nanking," 182. 86 Daqing Yang, "The Challenges of the Nanjing Massacre," 162.
